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Abstract:

Australian fire services provide two broad types of warning to people in bushfire (or wildfire)
risk areas. Fire Danger Ratings communicate the possible consequences of a bushfire due to
its rate of spread, intensity and difficulty of suppression. Warnings are also issued to alert
people to impending bushfires and advise them how to respond. This paper examines how
people threatened by bushfires in New South Wales, Australia, in 2017 understood,
interpreted and acted upon warning messages. The research involved 113 semi-structured
interviews and an online survey of 549 households. Results indicate that while most people
found warnings easy to understand and useful, many did not respond in ways intended by fire
services. Notably, the research highlights the tendency for people to seek confirmation of the
bushfire threat before taking protective action, most commonly to avoid unnecessary
evacuation and its associated costs. Furthermore, the research identifies three key messages in
bushfire warnings that are not personally meaningful for many people because they do not
align with how they are likely to respond to a bushfire. These include: (1) people should leave
bushfire risk areas on days of Catastrophic fire danger, before there is a fire; (2) houses are
not defendable under Catastrophic conditions; and (3) people should ‘leave early’. The paper
offers suggestions on how fire authorities can provide better information to help people to
make more effective decisions by acknowledging and working within the context in which
warnings are understood, interpreted and acted upon.

Keywords: bushfire; wildfire; information; warnings; preparation; evacuation; defence.
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1. Introduction
Australian fire services issue warnings to alert people to the threat posed by bushfires (or
wildfires) and to advise them how to respond. An important part of the warnings context in
Australia is that people are permitted to choose whether they will leave (evacuate) when
threatened by bushfire (preferably ‘early’) or stay to defend their houses and property against
the fire (AFAC 2012; Handmer and Tibbits 2005; Whittaker et al. 2013). This is in contrast to
other wildfire prone countries where evacuation is the norm (see Paveglio et al. 2012,
McCaffrey et al. 2015, and McGee 2019 for discussion of the relative merits of the different
approaches to wildfire response). Australian bushfire warnings, then, may encourage people
to leave, initiate property defence or, if evacuation is deemed unsafe, to seek shelter. Fire
services invest considerable amounts of time and money trying to get the wording and timing
of warning messages right. Yet there is a growing literature that suggests people do not
always respond to warnings in ways fire services intend. Research has shown that some
people in bushfire risk areas are unaware of the risk (e.g. Whittaker et al. 2013; Horsey and
Penman 2014), are not adequately prepared to safely respond (e.g. Eriksen and Gill 2010;
Penman et al. 2013) and wait until the last moment before evacuating (e.g. Haynes et al.
2010; McLennan et al. 2015). Some even enter fire affected areas to return to their
properties, and may evade road blocks to do so (Wilkinson et al. 2016).

This paper contributes to this literature by examining how people threatened and affected by
bushfires in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, in 2017 understood, interpreted and acted
upon warning messages they received. This provides a case study of the ways that people
behave when they receive a warning message, in contrast to the way that the fire and
emergency services intend for people to respond when they send out the messages. This study
then seeks to determine the extent to which warning messages sent by a particular fire agency
were useful and meaningful for the people who received them. The research is focused on
responses to warnings sent during bushfires in New South Wales (NSW) in 2017 and within
the somewhat unique approach to bushfire safety used in Australia. Nevertheless, findings
about why people do not respond to warnings in ways intended by fire and emergency
services may provide insights into delayed warning response or non-response for wildfires in
other countries (e.g. Cohn et al. 2006; McCaffrey et al. 2018) or for other hazards.

2. Australian bushfire warning systems
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In Australia, responsibility for issuing bushfire warnings rests with state and territory fire
services (Anderson-Berry et al. 2018). Two main types of warnings are issued: information
about predicted danger if a fire were to start (in the form of Fire Danger Ratings); and alerts
about impending fires that may impact on people or a community.

The Fire Danger Rating (FDR) is a warning system that produces and communicates
information about possible consequences of a bushfire based on predicted conditions
including temperature, humidity, wind and landscape dryness (CSIRO 2018). Regionallyspecific FDRs are issued daily, for the following day, regardless of whether there is a fire, via
multiple channels including weather forecasts, websites and social media, radio and
television broadcasts, and newspapers. Prior to 2009 there were five FDRs: Low; Moderate;
High; Very High; and Extreme. After the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires, which killed 173
people and destroyed over 2000 homes in the state of Victoria, ‘Severe’ and ‘Catastrophic’
FDRs were introduced. These ratings were intended to communicate the increased risks to
life and property on the days of highest fire danger, when conditions demand a different
response (Teague et al. 2010). Table 1 outlines current FDRs and advice from the NSW Rural
Fire Service (NSWRFS) for each level of fire danger. This general advice is intended to help
people consider their options and plan their response to bushfire. Actual warnings about fire
danger are more concise and directive. For example, a warning sent via SMS to people in the
Hunter, Central Ranges and North Western regions of NSW in 2017 read as follows:
‘Dangerous fire weather across NSW. Catastrophic fire danger forecast in some areas. Avoid
bush fire prone areas. Info: www.rfs.nsw.gov.au or 1800679737’.

Fire Danger Rating What you should do
Catastrophic
For your survival, leaving early is the only option.
Leave bush fire prone areas the night before or early in the day – do
not just wait and see what happens.
Make a decision about when you will leave, where you will go,
how you will get there and when you will return.
Homes are not designed to withstand fires in catastrophic
conditions so you should leave early.
Extreme
Leaving early is the safest option for your survival.
If you are not prepared to the highest level, leave early in the day.
Only consider staying if you are prepared to the highest level – such
as your home is specially designed, constructed or modified, and
situated to withstand a fire, you are well prepared and can actively
defend it if a fire starts.
Severe
Leaving early is the safest option for your survival.
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Well prepared homes that are actively defended can provide safety
– but only stay if you are physically and mentally prepared to
defend in these conditions.
If you’re not prepared, leave early in the day.
Very high
High
Low-moderate

Review your bush fire survival plan with your family. Keep
yourself informed and monitor conditions be ready to act if
necessary.

Table 1: Fire Danger Ratings and associated advice (NSWRFS 2018)

Fire services also issue warnings to alert people to impending bushfires and provide advice
on how to respond. All state and territory warning systems use a three-level alert process:
1) ‘Advice’ indicates that a fire has started but there is no immediate danger. People are
advised to stay up to date in case the situation changes.
2) ‘Watch and Act’ – indicates a heightened level of threat. People are advised that
conditions are changing and they need to start taking action to protect themselves and
their family.
3) ‘Emergency Warning’ indicates people are in danger and immediate protective action is
required.

This process was developed as part of the National Framework for Scaled Advice and
Warnings to the Community. The process of escalation of alerts from Advice through to
Emergency Warning is intended to minimise ‘over-warning’ or warning fatigue (AEMC
2009). The exact wording and advice contained in warnings depends on the warning channel
(e.g. landline telephone; SMS; radio broadcast etc.) and the action that is advised (e.g.
evacuate; shelter-in-place). Fire services use a range of channels to communicate warnings
including mobile and landline telephones, mobile phone apps, radio, television and social
media.

3. Public responses to warnings
3.1 Effective warnings
Generally, a good warning message is distinguished from a poor one by its content –
including information about the nature, location, guidance, time, and source of the hazard or
risk – and style – including its specificity, consistency, accuracy, certainty, and clarity
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(Sorensen 2000). Wood et al. (2018) reviewed warnings research for hazards and disasters,
finding that effective warning messages: (a) describe the hazard or event, including the threat
posed, the consequence of the hazard’s impact, and how advised actions can reduce such
consequences; (b) provide protective action guidance, explaining exactly how to take
recommended actions; (c) specify the location of the event, stating who will and will not be
affected and where people who will need to take protective action are located; (d) provide a
time when people should begin taking protective action and when it should be completed; (e)
state who the message is from, preferably a mixed panel of the most credible official and
familiar sources; and (f) are clearly worded, specific about what is said, accurate and
complete in the information provided, clear and unambiguous, and consistent.

3.2 Responses to warnings
Researchers have tended to characterise warning response as a primarily cognitive, linear
process involving a number of stages. For example, Lindell and Perry (1992) understand
warning response as a sequential, four-stage process in which a message receiver asks a
series of questions that shape their response. The first stage involves risk identification,
where the receiver asks: ‘Does the threat exist?’ Second, the receiver makes a risk
assessment, asking: ‘Is protection needed?’ Third, an assessment of risk reduction options is
made, with the receiver asking: ‘Is protection feasible?’ And finally, the receiver considers
possible protective responses, asking: ‘What action to take?’ In a similar vein, Mileti and
Sorensen (1990) describe a six-stage process involving: 1) hearing the warning; 2)
understanding the contents of the warning message; 3) believing the warning is credible and
accurate; 4) personalising the warning to oneself; 5) confirming the warning is true and that
others are taking heed; and 6) responding by taking protective action. Factors influencing
warning response include characteristics of the message sender, the receiver, the message
itself, and the social context in which the message is received (Mileti and Sorensen 1990;
Mileti 1999).

There are many reasons people may not respond to warnings in a timely manner. Drabek
(1999, p. 15) suggests that ‘... the first principle in understanding disaster warning responses
is to recognize explicitly that the initial response to any warning is ‘denial’. However, a
recent review of ‘denial’ in hazards and disaster research found little critical discussion of the
concept (McLennan et al. 2017). Furthermore, most of the studies used denial to explain
failures to perceive and mitigate risk in advance of a hazard, rather than to explain warning
6

response delay or non-response. Nevertheless, research confirms that certain cognitive biases
may influence warning responses (Omori et al. 2017). In particular, normalcy bias may cause
people to underestimate the possibility of a hazard occurring and its possible effects, which
may reduce receptiveness to warnings. When people recognise that a hazard may occur,
optimism bias can prevent them from personalising risk and therefore responding to warnings
(Omori et al. 2017). Prior experience with hazards and warnings may also influence
responses. Some studies have found that prior hazard experience increases the likelihood of
warning response, specifically evacuation (Sharma and Patt 2012), while repeated exposure
to ‘false alarms’ may impede or prevent responses to future warnings (e.g. Dow and Cutter
1998; Mackie 2014).

Social context is also important in understanding warning responses. When someone receives
a warning, they consider its meaning in relation to the ongoing stream of events in which they
are engaged (Brenitz 1983). This seems to be the case even when the warning is received in
the context of a situation that requires immediate compliance (such as an aircraft ground
proximity warning; DeCelles 1991). Historically, natural hazards research has understood
decision-making as a primarily cognitive process engaged in by individuals, rather than a
complex social process involving groups of people with different experiences, perspectives
and interests (Walker 1979). This perspective is evident in the ‘stimulus-response’ models of
hazard response discussed above (Mileti and Sorenson 1990; Lindell and Perry 1992) in
which individuals receive information about a hazard, consider their options and then choose
how they will respond (Basset and Fogelman 2013). However, as Drabek (1999) has noted,
much of the complexity in warning response is due to the fact that people are usually with
someone else when they receive a warning. Thus it is often groups, rather than individuals,
that ‘process’ warnings. This group processing of warnings rarely leads to an immediate
consensus as to what should be done (Drabek 1999). For example, research into the 2009
Black Saturday bushfires in south-eastern Australia highlighted the discussion and debate that
occurred in many households about whether it was necessary to evacuate (Whittaker et al.
2016). Similarly, a study of people evacuated from the north coast of New Zealand during the
2009 Samoan Tsunami found people discussed the warning they received with friends and
peers before taking protective action (Couling 2014).

The tendency for people to seek confirmation of warning messages before taking protective
action is well documented (e.g. Perry 1979; Mileti and Sorenson 1990; Parker and Handmer
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1998; Bean et al. 2015; Wood et al. 2018). After receiving a warning people will almost
always attempt to confirm the warning message by surveying the environment, observing the
behaviour of others, talking to friends or relatives, or contacting some official source. When
people are unable to confirm the message – for example because there is no sign of the
hazard in the environment, or others appear unconcerned – they are less likely to take
protective action in a timely manner (Perry 1979). Wood et al. (2018, p. 556) propose that the
process of confirming warning messages can be characterised as ‘milling’, whereby people
interact with others (mill) in order ‘... to generate new perceptions and norms to guide their
behavior in unfamiliar circumstances’. Their experimental study examining participants’
envisaged responses to a hypothetical warning about an explosion of an improvised nuclear
device suggests that longer warning messages may reduce people’s inclination to confirm and
search for more information, thereby shortening response delay. However, Parker and
Handmer (1998) note that, while warning systems may attempt to provide confirmation, those
who are at risk usually seek out alternative information sources. Thus, to at least some extent,
and whether it is beneficial or detrimental to warning response, confirmation remains a
certain feature of the warning process (Brotzge and Donner 2013).

3.3 Responses to bushfire warnings
In Australia, research suggests people typically find official warning messages easy to
understand and useful (Horsey and Penman 2014; Trigg et al. 2014; Every et al. 2016). For
example, Horsey and Penman (2014) found most respondents impacted by the October 2013
NSW bushfires agreed the warnings they received were ‘clear’ (73%), ‘relevant’ (71%) and
‘sufficient’ (69%). Respondents judged information obtained via radio to be ‘useful’ (90%),
‘timely’ (85%), of the ‘right frequency’ (87%) and ‘sufficiently localised’ (78%). Similarly,
information obtained via the internet was seen as ‘useful’ (94%), ‘up to date’ (76%) and
‘sufficiently localised’ (83%).

A number of studies have found that most people find out about bushfires not from official
warnings but via environmental cues and communication with family, friends and neighbours
(Strahan, 2018; Whittaker et al. 2013). Half of all survey respondents (n=1314) affected by
the 2009 Black Saturday fires found out about the fire by seeing or smelling smoke (32%) or
through communications with family, friends or neighbours (21%). Less than one-tenth found
out via an official warning (8%) (Whittaker et al. 2013). Similarly, Strahan (2018) found that
residents affected by the 2014 Perth Hills and 2015 Adelaide Hills fires commonly became
8

aware of the fire via environmental cues (55%) and communications with family, friends and
neighbours (21%). One-fifth became aware of the fire after receiving an official warning
(8%) or obtaining emergency information via television, radio, social media or emergency
service websites and apps (16%). Numerous studies have outlined the importance of
unofficial warnings to public responses in emergencies and disasters (e.g. Parker and
Handmer 1998; Nagarajan et al. 2012; Cheshire 2015).

Other research has highlighted the tendency for people to wait until they are threatened
before taking protective action (e.g. Rhodes 2005; Whittaker and Handmer 2010; McLennan
et al. 2013 and 2015; Strahan et al. 2018). For example, Rhodes (2005) surveyed 718
households in bushfire risk areas of Victoria, finding approximately 60 percent intended to
wait until a fire was threatening before deciding whether to evacuate or stay and defend.
Similarly, McLennan et al.’s (2015) review of seven post-bushfire interview studies found
‘appreciable’ proportions (ranging from 5-29%) intended to ‘wait and see’. This approach is
discouraged by Australian fire services because it increases the risk that people will evacuate
at the last minute or become trapped in locations where safe sheltering or defence is not
possible (Haynes et al. 2010; Blanchi et al. 2014; Whittaker et al. 2017).

Relatively few studies have examined intended and actual responses to FDRs and associated
advice. Research following the introduction of the ‘Code Red’ FDR in Victoria (the
equivalent of a Catastrophic FDR in other states) in 2009 found 50-60% of residents intended
to leave on Code Red days, with many intending to leave the night before or early in the
morning (i.e. before a fire started or threatened) (Whittaker and Handmer 2010). However, a
subsequent survey of 602 residents following a Code Red day found that two-thirds remained
at their home or property (Strahan Research 2010). Of the third that was not at home, just
1.5% left because of the Code Red FDR. Asked how they would respond to a future Code
Red FDR, almost three-quarters (73%) indicated they would not leave the night before or
early in the morning, as advised by the Country Fire Authority (CFA). Three-quarters (78%)
of those who intended to leave on a future Code Red day said they would only do so once
there was a fire (Strahan Research 2010). A meta-analysis of seven post-bushfire interview
studies between 2009 and 2014 (McLennan et al. 2015) found ‘appreciable’ percentages of
householders (ranging from 27-52%) stayed to defend their properties under Extreme and
Catastrophic/Code Red fire danger conditions, despite advice emphasising leaving as the
safest option.
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This paper, then, examines the responses of people to bushfire warnings sent during bushfires
in NSW in 2017. It considers whether people found the warnings they received easy to
understand and useful but more importantly investigates how people responded to these
warnings. In particular, we were interested in any mismatch between actions recommended
by the fire service and actions carried out by members of the community. The reasons why
such mismatches occur can potentially provide important information about the kinds of
factors that prevent people from responding to warnings in a timely manner. This potentially
provides important information for fire services that can be used to enhance the way that
public information and warnings are provided during natural hazards.

4. Research methods
The research involved semi-structured interviews with people threatened and impacted by
three bushfires in NSW in 2017 and an online survey of people living in bushfire risk areas in
NSW. The research focused on a range of issues related to people’s planning, preparation and
responses to bushfires (see Whittaker and Taylor 2018) and was funded by the NSWRFS.
Ethics approval was obtained from the University of Wollongong Human Research Ethics
Committee (Ethics no. 2017/216).

4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews
139 semi-structured interviews were conducted in June and July 2017 with 146 people
affected by the Currandooley (36 interviews), Taliesen Road (38) and Sir Ivan (39) fires (see
Table 2). The interviews comprised open-ended questions about: perceptions and
understandings of bushfire risk; planning and preparation; intended and actual responses; and
impacts of the fires on people, property, animals and other values (e.g. environmental
amenity). Semi-structured interviewing allows interviewees to frame and structure their
responses according to their own personal experiences and narratives. The advantage of this
approach is that the interviewee’s perspectives and experiences unfold as the participant
views it, not as the interviewer views it (Marshall and Rossman 2014). This allows
interviewees to tell their own, unique story and can help researchers to identify issues,
perspectives and lines of questioning not previously considered.

Fire
Currandooley

Date
17 January 2017

FDR
Severe

Areas affected
Tarago and Mt Fairy

Impacts
- 3,378 hectares of

10

Sir Ivan

12 February 2017

Catastrophic

Dunedoo, Leadville,
Cassilis, Coolah and
Uarbry

Taliesen Road

17 February 2017

Very High

Carwoola

land burnt
- One house and
multiple sheds
destroyed
- Two vehicles
destroyed
- 20 sheep and
cattle killed and
losses of
agricultural assets
including fences
and pasture
- 55,37 hectares of
land burnt
-35 houses, 131
outbuildings and
two community
buildings
destroyed
- Significant losses
of livestock and
agricultural assets
including fences
and pasture
- 3,134 hectares of
land burnt
- 11 houses and 45
outbuildings
destroyed
- Losses of
agricultural and
other assets
including fences,
pasture, gardens
and animals

Table 2: Outline of the fires studied
Interviews were undertaken in participants’ homes and, in a few cases, at local fire brigade
sheds or cafes. Some interviews were undertaken with more than one person. Participants
were given time to read a participant information sheet prior to the interview commencing,
and written consent was obtained. Interviews typically lasted for 45 minutes to one hour and
were audio recorded with participants’ consent. Audio recordings were transcribed in full,
generating over 2100 pages of interview transcript. NVivo 11 (QSR International) was used to
analyse the transcripts. Categories into which segments of text could be grouped (known as
‘nodes’ in NVivo) were developed in collaboration with NSWRFS. Data relating to bushfire
warnings and information were sought by NSWRFS and collated using the following nodes:
(a) effectiveness of Catastrophic fire danger warnings; (b) effectiveness of bushfire warnings;
and (c) how people obtained bushfire-related information. The process of analysing
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interviews involved reading transcripts in full and selecting text to assign to relevant nodes
(‘coding’). This process enabled segments of text to be grouped into relevant nodes to enable
closer analysis (Thomas 2006).

4.2 Online Survey
A questionnaire was developed in consultation with the NSWRFS to survey areas throughout
NSW that were threatened by bushfires and/or experienced Catastrophic fire danger in 2017
(see Whittaker and Taylor 2018, Appendix 3). The purpose of the questionnaire was to gather
quantitative data on issues and themes explored in the interviews. The questionnaire
comprised 23 questions about warnings and information people received or obtained during
the period of bushfire threat. For each warning source (see Table 4) respondents were asked
to indicate whether they believed warnings were timely, up to date, easy to understand,
sufficiently localised and useful. The online survey launched on the SurveyMonkey.com
website on Thursday 17 August and closed on Sunday 24 September 2017. 624 responses
were received. 75 responses were deemed insufficiently complete because no questions, or
only demographic questions, were answered. These responses were removed, leaving a total
of 549 responses with an 89% completion rate. Half of all survey respondents (52%, n=253)
indicated they were impacted or threatened by a bushfire in NSW in 2017. Key
characteristics of the online survey are outlined in Table 3. Online survey data were analysed
using the SPSS Statistics software.











Gender: 61% women; 38% men; 1% identified as an ‘other’ gender.
Age: 8% 18-24; 17% 25-34; 24% 35-44; 25% 45-54; 19% 55-64; 6% 65-74; 1% 75+
Property type: 44% house or unit on residential block; 37% house on a hobby farm
or small acreage; 16% house on a large farm property.
Occupancy: 95% primary place of residence.
Tenure type: 80% owned with or without mortgage; 16% renting; 2% managing
house or property; 3% other arrangement.
Tenure length: 39% 0-5 years; 20% 6-10 years; 21% 11-20 years; 19% 20+ years.
Household composition: 47% couple with children or dependents; 27% couple
without children or dependents; 10% shared house with other adults; 6% single-parent
households; 6% single-person households.
Animals: 73% pets or companion animals; 21% horses; 18% ‘pet’ livestock; 15%
commercial livestock; 14% working or service dogs.
Association with NSWRFS: 29% volunteer members; 8% past members; 10%
Community Fire Unit members.
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Table 3: Key characteristics of the online survey sample

4.3 Limitations
The study has a number of limitations. The interview sample was opportunistic in the sense
that researchers visited properties on weekdays during business hours and interviewed
residents who were present at the time. As such, those who work during business hours or
were living elsewhere because their home was destroyed are probably underrepresented in the
sample. However, this limitation was anticipated in the study design and attempts to counter
it were made via a letterbox drop and distribution of invitations to participate via local
networks (Facebook, email lists etc.). A number of interviews were arranged out of business
hours and at alternate locations with these residents. While the interviews were conducted
relatively soon after the fires (within six months), it is possible that participants may have
been unable to recall some details. The online survey was primarily advertised through the
NSWRFS Facebook page and volunteer members were well represented in the sample. While
the sample captures considerable diversity in demographic characteristics, property types and
bushfire knowledge and preparedness (see Table 2), it cannot be claimed to be representative
of the wider population. Additionally, hindsight bias – where outcome information influences
respondents’ recollections of their prior knowledge or beliefs (Bradfield and Wells 2005) –
may have influenced some of the data collected. Social desirability bias – where respondents
give responses in a way they deem to be more socially acceptable than would be their ‘true’
response (Lavrakas 2008) - is unlikely to have influenced data given that the questionnaires
were anonymous and many interviewees were openly critical of warnings and in many cases
described responses that contravened the advice of authorities.

5. Results
5.1 Fire Danger Ratings and associated warnings
Just under half of all survey respondents (46%, n=231) received an official warning via SMS
or telephone about the Catastrophic FDR. This warning states that homes are not designed to
withstand fires in catastrophic conditions so leaving early is the only safe option. The
warning further states that people should leave bushfire prone areas the night before or early
in the day and not just wait and see what happens (see Table 1). Most thought the warning
was easy to understand (88%, n=197), timely (83%, n=192) and useful (78%, n=174).
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Respondents on residential blocks more often found the warning useful (84%, n=76) than
those on large farm properties (70%, n=32) and hobby farms/small acreages (74%, n=62).

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Discussed Looked for Looked for
threat with info. about info. about
family, fires in area preparing
friends,
neighbours

Readied
Began
equipment preparing
to protect to leave
house or
property

Left for a
place of
safety

Nothing

Other

Figure 1: Response to Catastrophic FDR (%, n=231)

After receiving the warning, respondents most commonly discussed the bushfire threat with
family, friends or neighbours (62%, n=143) and looked for information about bushfires in
their area (61%, n=141). More than a third of respondents got equipment ready to protect the
house or property (38%, n=88) or began preparing to leave (38%, n=87). A much smaller
proportion left for a place of relative safety after receiving a warning about the Catastrophic
FDR (12%, n=28), as is advised by fire services.

When asked what they would do if a Catastrophic FDR was issued for their area next
summer, 12% of respondents (n=28) indicated they would leave before there was a fire and
24% said they would wait for a fire and then leave (n=53). One-quarter intended to wait to
see if there was a fire before making a decision about whether to stay or leave (24%, n=53)
and a similar proportion said they would get ready to protect their house and property (27%,
n=60). A small proportion said a Catastrophic FDR would not influence what they did (4%,
n=9).
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Of the three sites where interviews were undertaken, Sir Ivan was the only fire to burn under
Catastrophic fire danger conditions. Most interviewees were aware of the Catastrophic rating.
Graziers and other farmers appeared particularly cognisant of the risks if a fire was to start,
and some began preparing to move their livestock in case of a fire. For example, an
interviewee explained her family’s decision to remain on the farm instead of attending the
Dunedoo Show (similar to a carnival or fair):
It was 40 degrees [Celsius] at 8:00 in the morning. We’ve got little kids, so we decided
we weren’t going to go [to the Show]. My husband wasn’t really comfortable leaving the
farm on such a bad day... so we ended up staying here... On the Saturday afternoon we
started mustering [approx. 600 head of cattle] because, as you can see, we’ve got
Lucerne around the house here, and we actually had 60 hectares of sorghum crop, which
is a very green summer crop... Our plan was that all the stock would go onto that,
because it would be a pretty good buffer.... We’ve got a fire truck and a grader and a
backhoe... We just got everything sorted, so that we were ready for anything. – Cassilis,
Sir Ivan Fire

Others appeared to be aware of the Catastrophic FDR but acknowledged the warning had not
really influenced their planning or preparation for bushfire.

Interviewee: We did hear on the news about Sunday being a Catastrophic risk day,
which was well predicted... In hindsight, no, we weren’t ready at all. Didn’t have a plan
that would’ve worked...
Interviewer: So the Catastrophic warning didn’t influence anything you did?
Interviewee: Only to monitor it. No, not really. – Coolah, Sir Ivan Fire

Even when the Sir Ivan Fire had started, and despite awareness of the Catastrophic
conditions, some residents could not comprehend that a fire could reach them. The interview
excerpts below suggest while people may understand that ‘Catastrophic’ denotes the worst
possible conditions for bushfires, they may not understand what this means for fire
behaviour. In particular, it appears some people did not appreciate the speed and distance that
a fire burning under Catastrophic fire danger conditions could travel:
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Those warnings, they did get through... Yeah, we were all aware of that. Even with
knowing that it was Catastrophic, we still didn’t, couldn’t... It wasn’t within our minds to
picture that a fire could travel that far. – Coolah, Sir Ivan Fire
I didn’t think it was close and I didn’t have any idea it was moving as fast as it was. I’ve
seen bushfires with a front where it eats its way along, but this thing! When the [road]
verge exploded into flames, the actual fire front was probably half a kilometre away. –
Uarbry, Sir Ivan Fire

Interviews with people affected by the Currandooley and Taliesen Road fires also provided
insights into how people understand and intend to respond to Catastrophic FDRs. Some had
firm plans to leave on Catastrophic fire danger days, but stressed they would only leave once
a fire started. Leaving in the absence of a fire was widely regarded as unnecessary or
impractical:
Male: I know through being in the fire brigade that if it’s Catastrophic you should leave –
whether there is a fire or not. I don’t know if I agree with that, and I don’t think you could
convince a lot of people in the community to do that.
Female: I mean, if it was just a normal day, you’d go to work, the kids would go to
school...
Interviewer: But what if it was school holidays? Over summer? You wouldn’t be leaving if
there was a Catastrophic Fire Danger Rating without a fire?
Male: I don’t think so. If there was a fire, that’s different.
Female: I don’t think we would. I mean, I think you’d certainly be conscious of it. You
would have it in the back of your mind, but I don’t think we would go. – Carwoola,
Taliesen Road Fire
Interviewer: Would you leave on Catastrophic days, even if there’s no fire?
Male: Not going to happen. I think that’s really unrealistic, especially for people that have
livestock... The logistics of that are just ridiculous... If it was just people in a house and it
was a case of ‘Oh, we’ll go and stay at grandma’s or we’ll go and do whatever,’ that
would be fine. But in a rural area like this, I think that’s really difficult to do. – Carwoola,
Taliesen Road Fire
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Others had considered the risks on days of Catastrophic fire danger but said they would not
leave their house and would enact their plan to stay and defend. For example:
We’d still stay and we’d carry out our plan [to defend] anyway. I’m confident we would
do that. But I think we would be a lot more nervous. We would be looking for things to go
wrong. But then, as I say, we’re getting older and sooner or later we’re probably gonna
get to a stage where we can’t do this stuff anymore, in which case we might have to go
away. But that’s gonna be a while down the track I think. – Mount Fairy, Taliesen Road
Fire

5.2 Bushfire warnings and information
Survey results suggest a high degree of public satisfaction with bushfire warnings. As shown in
Table 4, most respondents (approx. 80%) believed warnings were easy to understand and useful.
The majority thought warnings were timely, up-to-date and sufficiently localised; however, there
was a considerable proportion that did not. For example, 39% of respondents did not think
official warnings via landline telephone were sufficiently localised. Around one-third did not
think SMS warnings were timely, up to date or sufficiently localised.

Timely

Up to date

Easy to
understand

Sufficiently
localised

Useful

Landline telephone

68 (n=34)

72 (n=36)

78 (n=39)

53 (n=26)

78 (n=40)

SMS

66 (n=78)

66 (n=78)

86 (n=105)

64 (n=76)

67 (n=78)

Radio

76 (n=56)

64 (n=47)

87 (n=65)

73 (n=54)

82 (n=61)

Fires Near Me

NA

66 (n=130)

88 (n=172)

76 (n=148)

82 (n=159)

RFS updates,
interviews, media
conferences

71 (n=111)

68 (n=108)

84 (132)

69 (n=109)

73 (n=114)

Table 4: Survey respondents’ assessments of official warnings (in percentages)

It is important to recognise that survey respondents were threatened to varying degrees by
different fires, which will have influenced the timing, content and relevance of warnings to
receivers. Nevertheless, the results presented in Table 3 suggest, overall, a high degree of
satisfaction with the warnings and information received.

Many interviewees were already aware of the fire when they received an official warning via
telephone or SMS. They often became aware of a fire by seeing or smelling smoke, through
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communication with relatives, friends and neighbours, or by seeing or hearing activity
associated with firefighting, such as sirens. However, for some, receipt of a warning
communicated the danger posed by the fire and confirmed the need to take action:
Female: It was reinforcing that the fire was a problem. Some people said they didn’t get
any notification, but he had a phone, I had a phone, and we both got the message.
Male: We were certainly notified. It was nice to hear it. Just to know that we were not
doing things for nothing, I suppose. – Carwoola, Taliesen Road Fire

Once aware that a fire was threatening, people typically began an ongoing process of
information search that included communication with others within the threatened area (e.g.
relatives, neighbours, NSWRFS members) and information searches via the internet or smart
phone apps. Interview data highlight the tendency for people to call or SMS others within the
local area to obtain and share information about the fire. These communications often alerted
people who were unaware of the fire, in some cases because they were inside working or trying
to stay cool.

In some cases, receipt of a warning prompted people to return to their house or property. Of
those who were not at home when they found out a bushfire was threatening (40%, n=99),
almost three-quarters attempted to return (71%, n=67).1 The main reasons people returned were
to defend houses and property, to assist or rescue other household members, and to protect pets
and other animals. For example, one interviewee explained how he returned home to protect his
livestock after becoming aware of the fire:

We were in town when the fire started... You'll hear a lot of gripes about the police
blocking off the road. We stayed there [at the road block] for a little while, but then,
because we’ve got sheep and livestock, we are in habit of using our back neighbour’s
shearing shed, and so I took my Sedan, car, not built for it, back in through our
neighbour’s place... I remember a creek crossing, which was very rocky, scraped the car a
bit, but we got home. – Carwoola, Taliesen Road Fire

1

This figure is calculated from 95 responses (four respondents did not answer the question).
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There were numerous examples where people did not respond to warnings immediately. A key
insight from the interview data is that many interviewees received notification of the fire and
information relating to its location, direction and rate of spread, then sought visual confirmation
in order to make their own assessment of the threat. Direct observation of the fire appears to
have helped people ready themselves to begin defending, or confirm the need to leave:
I had the Fires Near You [sic] app2, watching it, keeping updated, going up to the top of
the hill, driving down to the fire zone, just keeping an idea of where [the fire] is and
what’s happening. – Cassilis, Sir Ivan Fire

I actually saw the smoke when the fire started. So I smelt the smoke and I drove up to
where the fire started. You can see it from Taylors Creek Road. So I drove up [there]...
and noticed it was going to be a dangerous fire. – Mount Fairy, Taliesen Road Fire

There were also cases where people received a warning that did not align with their assessment
of the risk. For example, one resident threatened by the Sir Ivan Fire could not recall specific
information or advice provided in a recorded landline telephone message, but remembered
finding it confusing. The degree of danger it conveyed did not align with his assessment that the
fire was far away and probably not a threat to him:
It wasn’t a personal call, it was a recording. But it was confusing. It didn’t say ‘You need
to evacuate’... I thought, ‘Okay, I’m not going to evacuate because it’s a long way away
and there’s a lot of time’, and there was no wind. It was hot and shocking, but it wasn’t
howling or anything. They’d gone off to fight this fire and then I saw, later in the day,
planes and I thought: ‘Oh f*ck it, it’s fine. They’ve got a really good chance’ [of
containing the fire]. Anyway... it was confusing. It said something about it being
dangerous in the area and I knew all that anyway. So that was that. – Coolah, Sir Ivan
Fire

Similarly, a resident in Uarbry explained how the recorded message he received did not align
with his assessment of the weather conditions and the seriousness of the bushfire. Direct advice
from a police officer eventually motivated him to leave:
‘Fires Near Me’ is a NSWRFS mobile phone app that provides warnings and information on incidents across
NSW attended by the NSWRFS and other agencies.
2
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The phone would ring and I’d pick it up: ‘This is the RFS... You’ve gotta get out, be
prepared. FIRE!’, and all the rest of it. But I didn’t take heed of that because I’m looking
around... Well I just couldn’t believe it, that this was an area where it was going to go up
like that. I didn’t think the fire was as big as it was. But it came on that quick, and I’m
glad the police got me out. – Uarbry, Sir Ivan Fire

Responsibilities for animals also delayed or prevented people from responding to warnings. For
example, interviewees in Coolah explained how their inability to relocate their horses prevented
them from leaving after receiving advice to do so from local police. Similarly, a resident on a
small acreage at Carwoola received warning about the fire, which included advice to evacuate,
but monitored the progress of the fire using the Fires Near Me app and direct observation to
determine whether it was really necessary to leave. She did not want to cause stress for her
animals by relocating them unnecessarily, or inconvenience others who might have to help:

I was also keeping an eye on the... Fires Near Me app, the RFS app, for updates as well,
just trying to gauge what their response was, whether it was as urgent as what it seemed.
Because when you’re standing on your block looking at smoke that seemed to be a few
kilometres away, it’s really hard to get any sense of urgency because it looks like it’s
going away. And thinking about the logistics of trying to catch squillions of chickens and
loading up cars and trailers and inconveniencing people who potentially then might have
had to turn around and bring all my birds back again, it was just … It was really difficult
to try and work out whether there was an immediate need to go or not. Then yeah, when
the wind changed we realised we just needed to get out.

She explained her dilemma further:
Do you go through that whole evacuation process knowing that the fire looks like it’s
going away from you and it could be for absolutely nothing? Because animals get very
stressed when you grab them in a hurry. The chooks that I did get out all stress-moulted
and freaked out, lost all their feathers. Yeah, it was incredibly stressful. – Carwoola,
Taliesen Road Fire

20

Some people felt the warnings they received caused unnecessary worry or anxiety. An
interviewee explained how multiple SMS warnings about the Sir Ivan Fire contributed to his
wife’s sense of panic. Their plan was to stay and defend their house and farm property, a plan
they were already putting into action. He felt the SMS warning was not useful because they were
already aware of the fire and preparing to defend. Another interviewee threatened by the
Currandooley Fire was upset that her children received SMS warnings on their mobile phones,
which they found alarming:

We were already aware of it [the fire]. We knew what was going on and we knew exactly
how close it was... What upset me was that the kids were getting [warnings] on their
phones. And that’s fair enough, because [the warning] just goes out... But you have to
think of it from our situation... They go, ‘Guys, this is so bad. Our Dad’s out there’. So
then they worry about dad... – Tarago, Currandooley Fire

In each of the fires there were people who did not receive an official warning or, received a
warning after learning about the fire (‘too late’). Limited mobile phone coverage impeded
delivery of SMS warnings in each of the fires, but was most apparent in areas affected by the Sir
Ivan Fire. It is important to note that limited mobile phone coverage is an everyday challenge in
many of these areas, so most people were not relying on receiving a SMS warning.
Nevertheless, interviewees saw the benefits that would come with better mobile phone coverage,
including a greater capacity to communicate in emergencies.

6. Discussion
This research provides a case study of how people understood and responded to warning
messages sent during the 2017 New South Wales bushfires. Overall, our results suggest that
most people who received warnings about Catastrophic fire danger or actual bushfires in NSW
in 2017 found them easy to understand and considered them to be useful. However, this did not
mean that all people responded to warnings in ways intended by fire services. While some
people promptly took protective action after receiving a warning, the research found that many
people waited until they were directly threatened before taking action. This finding is consistent
with previous bushfire research (e.g. Rhodes 2005; Tibbits and Whittaker 2007; McLennan et al.
2013 and 2015).
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Also consistent with previous studies, this research highlights that, before taking protective
action, people will almost always attempt to confirm bushfire warnings by surveying the
environment or communicating with other people (Perry 1979). When they are unable to
confirm the threat, usually because it is not certain that they will be affected, warning response
is often delayed or avoided. Our research identifies a number of reasons people attempt to
confirm bushfire warnings. First, people seem to have some understanding of the dynamic
nature of bushfires and the possibility they will not be impacted. In the case of warnings about
fire danger conditions, there may not be a fire when the message is received. Even when there is
a fire, impact is not certain due to factors such as wind direction and the activities of firefighters.
As such, people may attempt to confirm that they are threatened to avoid unnecessary
evacuation and its associated costs (e.g. time, effort, distress). The cost-effectiveness of
evacuation is a particularly important consideration for those responsible for pets and animals,
which may be difficult to move or stressed by relocation (Heath et al. 2001; Thompson et al.
2018; Day 2017), as well as those who are engaged in economic activities such as farming,
where unnecessary evacuation may impose unacceptable financial costs (see Whittaker et al.
2012; Smith et al. 2015). Second, while people seem to have some understanding of the dynamic
nature of bushfires, they may not understand how fast fires can travel. There were numerous
instances in our research where warnings advised people to take protective action, yet they could
not confirm the threat because the fire seemed too far away or because some other factor such as
observed wind speed suggested it was not a threat. This mismatch between the information
contained in a warning and a person’s expectations of the fire’s behaviour may lead to additional
attempts to try to confirm the situation.

Clearly then, and despite most of our survey respondents indicating that they found bushfire
warnings easy to understand, many people did not respond to warnings as fire services had
hoped. Does this mean that bushfire warnings were not effective? There is relatively little
research on the effectiveness of bushfire warnings. While qualities such as ‘usefulness’,
‘timeliness’ and ‘accuracy’ can be assessed by questioning those who receive warnings, it is
more difficult to discern whether a warning has prompted ‘appropriate’ responses. This is
because there is no ‘one’ appropriate response to bushfire. Australians have the option to decide
whether they will evacuate or stay to defend their house or property against bushfire, and receipt
of a warning may prompt either of these responses (or even a mix of responses within a
household). Furthermore, the circumstances of those at risk may necessitate different responses
to warning messages. For example, a warning issued during the 2018 Reedy Swamp fire in Bega
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Valley (NSW) advised people in the town of Tathra to shelter as the fire arrived because
evacuation was no longer considered a safe option. Those who were north of the Bega River
were advised to leave if their path was clear to the north. For the latter, an appropriate response
to this warning depended on their assessment of the hazardousness of their evacuation route,
which may have been affected by fire, fallen trees or other hazards. For these reasons,
‘compliance’ is not a meaningful or useful measure of warning effectiveness in the bushfire
context. Accordingly, Handmer (2000) argues that warning providers should be held responsible
for producing warning messages that are meaningful for intended audiences and not for people’s
decision-making, which is highly context-dependent.

Indeed, our research draws attention to three key messages in bushfire warnings that are not
personally meaningful for many people because they do not align with how they are likely to
respond to a bushfire. First, in relation to warnings about Catastrophic fire danger, most people
do not intend to leave bushfire risk areas unless there is a fire. Advice to leave before there is a
fire is widely seen as impractical and ignored. In this study, just one-in-ten respondents left for a
place of safety after receiving a Catastrophic fire danger warning and one-in-ten said they would
respond to future warnings in this way. These findings support earlier studies that found only
small proportions of people evacuated based on official warnings about fire danger conditions
(Strahan Research 2010; McLennan et al. 2013, 2015). In addition to being seen as offering
impractical advice, Catastrophic fire danger warnings lack the degree of specificity that is
needed to motivate most people to take protective action. As Wood et al. (2018) note, warnings
are unlikely to encourage protective action if they fail to provide specific details about the threat,
who will be affected, and necessary protective actions. Given that this advice is seen as
impractical, and the inherent lack of specificity in warnings, enhanced messaging is unlikely to
be effective in increasing the number of people who leave in the absence of fire on Catastrophic
fire danger days.

Second, many people do not accept the message that houses are not defendable under
Catastrophic conditions. In this study, four-in-ten respondents who received a warning about
Catastrophic fire danger began readying equipment to protect their house or property. More than
a quarter said they would do the same in response to a future warning. The legacy of the ‘stay
and defend’ approach in Australia should not be underestimated. As Handmer and Tibbits
(2005) have documented, the approach evolved from traditions of rural self-reliance and
household firefighting practices throughout Australia. Given these longstanding traditions, it is
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understandable that changes to policy and messaging in the relatively short time since Black
Saturday are not yet widely accepted or implemented. Studies of bushfires since 2009 have
consistently found that a substantial proportion of people continue to stay and defend against
bushfire, including under Catastrophic conditions (McLennan et al. 2015; Wilkinson and
Eriksen 2015). Findings from this research also support previous studies that highlight the strong
resolve of agricultural landholders to stay and defend their homes, livestock and livelihoods
against fires (Whittaker et al. 2012; Smith et al. 2015). Enhanced messaging may motivate some
people to leave in a timely manner; however, it is unlikely to persuade those who are committed
to remaining at their home or property to evacuate.
Third, our findings suggest that many people do not understand or accept the ‘leave early’
message. Earlier research into public understandings of the ‘Prepare, Stay and Defend or Leave
Early’ (PSDLE) policy identified confusion over what ‘leave early’ means (i.e. what constitutes
‘early’) and at what point the decision should be made (Tibbits and Whittaker 2007). McLennan
et al.’s (2012, p.923) analysis of interviews with residents affected by the Murrindindi fire on
Black Saturday reached a similar conclusion, finding that research participants had a clearer
understanding of ‘staying and defending’ than ‘leaving early’ due to an overemphasis on
property defence in bushfire safety education. However, our findings also suggest that many
people reject the ‘leave early’ message because they want to avoid unnecessary evacuation and
its associated costs. This process of confirming warnings and threats has been characterised in
warnings research as ‘milling’ (Wood et al. 2018), implying a degree of inaction and confusion.
Yet our results suggest that, at least in the context of bushfire, the process of confirmation can be
an active and purposeful one.

What, then, can be done to facilitate more timely responses to warnings? We argue that it is
important to acknowledge and work within the context in which warnings are understood,
interpreted and acted upon by members of the community. In terms of warning messages, there
is scope to improve the content and wording to more clearly communicate the threat posed by
bushfires and the need to take protective action. For example, our research found that, even
under Catastrophic fire danger conditions, some people underestimated the speed at which fire
can move through the landscape. Enhanced education and risk communication in warnings – for
instance by describing possible rates of spread and likely impacts of fires in prevailing
conditions – may help people to better understand the threat posed by fires. However, our results
suggest that confirmation remains an inevitable feature of the warning process. Enhanced
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warning messages may reduce the tendency for some people to seek confirmation (Wood et al.
2018); however, authorities should also consider ways to help people confirm warnings. For
example, the NSWRFS now deploys Community Field Liaison Officers (CFLOs) to public
places and known observation points to meet people at a time when they are searching for and
receptive to information. CFLOs can provide information and advice to help people confirm
warning messages and take timely protective action. Consideration should also be given to ways
to help people confirm warnings without travelling to observe a fire themselves. For example,
fire services’ sharing of their own and local people’s photos and videos of the fire via social
media could help people to personalise and confirm the threat, particularly when local people
and landmarks are featured. Furthermore, given the propensity for people threatened by bushfire
to leave when they see others doing so (Strahan 2017; McCaffrey et al. 2018), it may be
productive to share images of local people leaving the fire threatened area. Initiatives such as
these may help people to confirm warning messages, respond in a timely manner and avoid the
risks associated with last minute evacuation or entrapment at their home or property.

As discussed above, warnings that are not personally meaningful to people are unlikely to
motivate desired protective action, regardless of how they are worded. Advice to leave before
there is a fire on Catastrophic fire danger days is widely seen as impractical, and the suggestion
to ‘leave early’ is often ignored because people do not want to evacuate unnecessarily.
Similarly, some people reject the assertion that houses are not defendable under Catastrophic
conditions and intend to protect not just houses but other valued things such as animals, gardens,
buildings, sheds and livelihood assets (e.g. agricultural equipment, vehicles, fences, pasture).
Clearly, many people will be at home (or return home) when a fire threatens and, if they intend
to evacuate, will not leave until they are reasonably certain they will be impacted. Given the
risks associated with last-minute evacuation, fire services are likely to continue to advise people
to ‘leave early’. Providing greater clarity and specificity about what this means – for example by
recommending timeframes for specific areas – may help some people to leave before they are
directly threatened. However, greater consideration should also be given to strategies that
recognise the reality that many people will be at home when a fire threatens, including on
Catastrophic days. Insights from warning research suggest warnings and advice that encourage
people to evacuate as soon as a fire is threatening are more likely to be effective if they describe
the threat posed, possible consequences, and how people can take action to reduce such
consequences (Wood et al. 2018).
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7. Conclusion
This paper has examined how people who were threatened and affected by bushfires in NSW,
Australia, in 2017 understood, interpreted and acted upon warning messages they received. Our
findings highlight the tendency for people to seek confirmation that they are threatened before
taking protective action. This is consistent with findings from previous research and provides
further evidence for the importance of this behaviour in people’s responses to threat from natural
hazards. Most commonly, people sought to confirm the threat because they were not certain they
would be impacted and wanted to avoid unnecessary evacuation and its associated costs. While
there may be scope to improve the content and wording of warnings to better communicate the
threat posed by bushfires and the need for protective action, our own and others’ research
suggests that confirmation is an inevitable feature of the warning process. Further, we suggest in
contrast to previous research that, in the context of bushfire, the process of confirmation can be
an active and purposeful one. Consequently, rather than concentrating on attempts to reduce
confirmation through enhanced messaging, it may be productive for fire and emergency services
to give greater consideration to ways they might help people to confirm warning messages. The
NSWRFS’s use of Community Field Liaison Officers during bushfires is one example.

Critically, it is important for fire agencies to understand that many people do not accept some of
the key messages they are providing to the community: (1) that people should leave bushfire risk
areas on days of Catastrophic fire danger, before there is a fire; (2) that houses are not
defendable under Catastrophic conditions; and (3) that people should ‘leave early’. Despite
changes in policy and messaging since Black Saturday emphasising ‘leaving early’ as the safest
option, some people remain committed to staying to defend, many remain confused about the
meaning of ‘leave early’ and, upon receiving a warning, most will wait until they can confirm
the warning before taking protective action. It is clear that many people will be at home or
return home when a fire threatens and, if they intend to leave, are unlikely to do so until they are
reasonably certain they will be impacted. While changing such behaviour may be desirable, at
the same time it is important to acknowledge and work within the context in which warnings are
understood, interpreted and acted upon by members of the community.
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